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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

Appeal is taken from the District Court's Order of Dismissal and Judgment of Dismissal
of Defendant's Appeal of the Decree of Divorce-said order and judgment having been entered on
September 19, 2013 CR., Vol. I, pp 159-162), wherein the District Court Dismissed Defendant's
Appeal as untimely. Defendant was served with the Decree of Divorce by the Court on July 24,
2013, just one (1) day before the Notice of Appeal was due to be filed. See R., Vol. I, p. 85 notes
by clerk #2242 as to "refaxed" Decree.
B. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts.

Appellant stands by his statement of the course of proceedings and statement of facts.
Appellant would emphasize that Respondent stresses that Respondent's counsel told Appellant's
counsel she was going to file the Decree of Divorce. Stating that something is going to be done,
is not any kind of legally recognized notice that a thing has actually been done.

What is

important here is that when the Decree was filed, Appellant was not given notice that it had been
filed, as Appellant's counsel's facsimile number was incorrectly listed on the certificate of
service, which was supplied by Respondent. Appellant had no affirmative duty to continually
check with counsel for Respondent or the court to see if the Decree had in fact been filed by the
Respondent.
Heather's Response Brief has not countered Michael's claims that he did not receive
actual notice of the entered Decree. Heather's Response Brief focuses on her counsel's having
sent Michael's counsel a copy of the proposed brief and telling him that she would be filing the
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same if she did not hear back from him. This line of argument has no bearing on the legal issue
raised on appeal, that is the actual, or lack thereof, of actual notice of the the entry of the Decree.
Heather's Response brief cites the record stating that "Mr. Madsen has admitted he had
actual notice within the 42-day period. The Court finds the issue is clear, based upon the
applicable rules. It is jurisdictional." (TR. Motion to Dismiss, p.9, Lns. 22-25). As Michael has
pointed out, yes his counsel did have notice, 1 days notice (Id.). The question before this court
is, was the 1 day actual notice sufficient.
The cases cited by both parties dealt with actual notice of more than 1-2 days. Cline v.
Roemer, 97 Idaho 666, 667, 551 P.2d 621, 622 (1976) states that actual notice is effective even
when official notice has not been received.

While the Cline case does not state the actual

amount of time between notice and the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the court states" ... the
time for appeal from judgment has long since passed ... " Tanner v. Estate of Cobb, 101 Idaho
444, 614 P.2d 984 (1980), cited by Herrett v. Herrett, 105 Idaho 358, 360, 670 P.2d 63, 65 (Ct.
App. 1983), which dealt with thirteen (13) days actual notice of the underlying judgment.
In the case at hand, 'actual' notice at best, was one day before 'official' notice was given
by the district court, or two (2) days actual notice. The earliest date actual notice in this case
could only be said to have been given when Heather's counsel e-mailed a copy of the entered
Decree to Michael's counsel on July 23,2013 (R. Vol. I, p.118), two (2) days before the deadline
to file the Notice of Appeal.
Heather cites Swayne v. Otto, 99 Idaho 271, 272, 580 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1978) for the
proposition that constructive notice is sufficient. However, Swayne, supra, found constructive
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notice because counsel for Appellant had attended a hearing where the entered Order was in the
Court's file:
The holding of the district court was that appellants had "constructive notice" that
the judgment had been entered, notwithstanding the alleged omissions and errors
of the clerk, from the fact that at the hearing for costs on April 11, 1975, the
judgment was marked "filed" March 28, 1975, and was in the court's file at the
hearing and available to counsel.

Thus, the Swayne, supra, case is distinguishable. No hearings were attended, or held
wherein there was an entered Decree. Here we have merely that counsel for Heather indicated
she was going to file the proposed Decree. Tanner v. Cobb's Estate, 101 Idaho 444, 445, 614
P .2d 984, 985 (1980), citing Swayne, supra, states:
We conclude that although there is no showing in the court records of a mailing of
notice of entry of judgment, where appellants' counsel had actual notice of entry
of judgment thirteen days prior to expiration of the time for filing an appeal,
appellants' notice of appeal filed forty-four days after the entry of judgment was
not timely. See Swayne v. Otto, 99 Idaho 271, 580 P.2d 1296 (1978)

Again the courts were dealing with a situation where the appealing party had thirteen (13) days
actual notice. Klaudt v. Klaudt, 156 N.W.2d 72, 76 (N.D. 1968), again citing the Swayne
decision, supra, found:
In this case the record does not disclose that such a written notice was served
upon the defendant, but as she had actual notice of the entry of the judgment (as
evidenced by her first notice of motion to vacate the original judgment), the
purpose of the statute was fulfilled.

Nothing in the record in the instant case points to actual or constructive knowledge by Michael
of the entered Decree earlier than two (2) days prior to the running of his time in which to file a
Notice of Appeal.
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As stated and set forth in Michael's opening brief, the actual notice of the entered Decree
was one (1) day. (R., Vol. I, p. 85). The only question that this Court should decide is whether
one (1) day's notice of the entry of Decree was sufficient time for Michael to speak to his
counsel as to the issues to appeal; come up with the funds to retain counsel for his appeal; and
timely file his Notice of Appeal.

II.

ATTORNEY FEES-RESPONDENT
As to Heather's request for attorney fees, this request should be denied. Michael's appeal
presents genuine issues of law and fact concerning the adequacy of his actual and constructive
knowledge of the entry of the Decree from which he appeals. See Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho
85,93,822 P.2d 982,990 (1991):
Where an appeal presents a genuine issue of law, fact or discretion for review,
we will not award attorney fees on appeal. Spencer v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank,
106 Idaho 316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct.App.1984)
See also Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 93, 822 P.2d 982, 990 (1991): "Where an appeal
presents a genuine issue of law, fact or discretion for review, we will not award attorney fees on
appeal."

As set out previously, after the jUdgment of the court upon the record, Michael and

Heather began negotiating through their respective counsel as to distribution of the property and
a stipulated Decree for months prior to Michael receiving the recorded Decree and thought the
proposed Decree had not been submitted to the Court based upon said continuing negotiations.
Further, MS.Brown's position as to notice and opportunity to timely appeal is clearly
unreasonable since it was Ms. Brown who caused Mr. Brown's lack of knowledge as to the final
Decree as a result of her supplying the Clerk of Court the wrong fax number for his counsel.
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As a result of their bad conduct and unreasonable position they have taken in the above
matter, it is Mr. Brown who should be awarded his attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 12-121 should
he be the prevailing party in this appeal.
III.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to set aside
the District Court's Order dismissing the appeal in the above matter and for an order of
Appellant's attorney fees and costs.

~
Respectfully submitted this ;;:2~ day of April, 2014.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, PC,
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Appellant
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